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The National Public 
Security Policy: Background, 
dilemmas and perspectives
LUIZ EDUARDO SOARES
NEXT is the description of a process (successive attempts to formulate and implement policies through the elaboration of plans), seeking to understand its main movements (the advances and retreats, the 
pressures and reactions, the induction and the negotiations that characterized 
the recent experience of the several relevant players in the Public Security 
area, in a national scope). Not by chance, the verb used is to describe instead 
of to evaluate. For prudence and intellectual honesty, let’s discard false 
expectations: it’s very difficult to evaluate public security policies, as well as 
police performance. Such difficulty is not exclusively Brazilian. All over the 
world, among the experts and managers, scholars and professionals of that area, 
that’s a controversial issue. The controversies follow one another in international 
seminars and consultants’ visits. It’s easy to understand: a certain policy might 
be virtuous and, even so, the selected indicators may show a growth of the 
problems identified as being priorities – for example, the rates of certain kinds 
of criminality. The opposite is also believable: an inadequate policy may be 
accompanied by good results.
The police found land mines, arms, ammunitions and drugs in 
the underground of a dealer’s house in the Korea slum, in Senador 
Camará, West zone of Rio de Janeiro (RJ).
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 The evaluation problem
Laying simpler hypotheses aside, such as the seasonal1 effects and the 
relativity of the acceleration,2 there’s the prosaic hypothesis that social factors 
that foster the favorable conditions to the amplified reproduction of criminal 
practices – factors that are independent from police actions and external to the 
scope of public security policy intervention – continue to produce their effects 
and do that due to several reasons alien to the focused area, with growing 
power. In that case, even if there was an adequate, intelligent and consistent, 
efficient and effective security policy, the indicators could be negative. They 
would probably be less bad than if the policy above wasn’t being adopted, but 
that would lead the analyst to a counterfactual argument impossible to be tested 
and, therefore, to prove.
 The opposite would also be feasible: the negative factors above could 
lose strength or even disappear, producing positive results alien to the security 
policies. 
Let’s consider four examples of the relatively autonomous participation of 
negative factors (the first and the fourth factors that will be mentioned next are 
actually positive per se, even though they’re negative from the point of view of 
its probable impact on public security): demographic dynamics or the quality of 
the public mother-child health, or the improvement of the sanitary conditions, 
resulting from an urbanization process, lead to an increase of young people 
in the population. We know that the magnitude of young people’s presence 
constitutes a significant variable for the panorama of criminality and violence. 
That’s a favorable context for the growth of the amount of crimes.
 Natural disasters, such as floods and tornados, may generate scarce 
supply, despair and a wave of pillages, thus producing a favorable environment 
for the proliferation of several kinds of criminal practices, both against life and 
against the patrimony.
 Economic crisis, generating mass unemployment and making 
inequalities more profound, in the opposite direction of an individualistic and 
equalitarian hegemonic culture, may work as a vector that turns the diffusion of 
criminal practices easier.
 Economic growth and increase in the average income, universal access 
to public education, in an environment of intense technological development, 
in the context of the expansion of what became a convention of calling 
“knowledge or information society”, turn simple the domestic reproduction of 
cultural undertakings (such as films and musical recordings) and uncontrollable 
its illicit distribution, jeopardizing the terms that traditionally define the 
intellectual property and fostering a real avalanche of the crimes nicknamed 
“piracy”.
 All four hypotheses together – or each one of them – correspond(s) to 
a set of factors independent from the police performance or that of the security 
policies, and represent(s) scenarios in which good practices – virtuous policies 
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and performances – can’t go beyond reducing damage or limiting negative 
consequences.  It would be unfair and inadequate to evaluate them according to 
the aggregate result of the shock among dynamics, vectors and processes, unless 
we did so in comparison to analogous situations.  
In a certain sense, independent vectors – those and others, including 
those that, besides being intrinsically positive, exercise auspicious pressure – are 
always acting, especially in unstable moments. Since it’s impossible to isolate the 
intervention realm of the policies and of the performances to be examined, it 
becomes necessary to be cautious and a reasonable dose of skepticism to apply 
the ceateris-paribus clause – let’s admit that, strictly speaking, it can only be 
applied in a laboratory. That hypothesis doesn’t work for social phenomena.
 The picture becomes really interesting when we observe that the success 
or the failure of such policies and performances contribute to the formation 
of positive or negative independent vectors, which turns the very notion of 
independence of the factors relative, which we have been considering until now.
 There are other difficulties: the improvement of the public security 
services may increase the level of trust of the population in the police, which, 
in turn, may lead to the increase of the amount of denunciations or of crime 
registers. That’s what typically occurs when, for example, the government 
offers women a respectful and distinct treatment, through the qualification 
of policemen and of the installation of Specialized Police Stations (Deam). 
The registered offenses grow exactly when the performance gets better and 
a positive policy is implemented – which often lead the unwary people in the 
media and the clever people in the opposition to unfair and hasty criticisms. 
Policies specifically devoted to reduce homophoby and racism produce the same 
effect. As a rule, the effect is felt in any area and it becomes stronger when it’s 
the public security and the criminal justice institutions, as a whole that improve 
themselves and conquer credibility.
 Surveys demonstrate that the citizen doesn’t seek the police when he’s 
a victim of crime, mainly for three reasons: the fear of being badly treated 
by the police itself; or being the target of revenge by the crime agent and his 
accomplices; and the lack of trust in the capability of the police, which would 
render worthless his effort to go to a Police Station. Therefore, it can be 
deduced that, if the results start to appear, a virtuous circle will be produced 
and the denunciations and registers will tend to arrive, which will increase 
the investigation and anticipation capacities of the police departments - if 
management is properly oriented. Of course, the argument is only valid if the 
registers grow to a certain extent; that’s hard to identify ex-ante, from which 
point on a saturation effect would be produced.
 The same thing would be true if the police departments demonstrate 
that they began to adopt respectful attitudes towards the citizens, regardless of 
their color, of the neighborhood where they live, of their age, of their sexual 
option, and of their social class. In both situations, the crimes’ figures would 
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tend to grow (not the facts, the figures), and the quality of the preemptive and 
repressive action would increase (the cautious observation presented before 
should be reinforced).
 Of course there’s always the resource to victimization surveys, which 
measure both events and perceptions. Regularly repeated, they’re the safest way 
to keep up with amounts and kinds of occurrences, as well as the popular trust 
in the police departments. However, they don’t solve the evaluation problem, 
because the reasons mentioned above persist
 There are also the prophecies that come in to being for themselves 
and the non-intentional effects of the social action – perverse or composition 
effects. Specially when evaluations don’t end in the academic exercises and 
convert themselves in instruments of monitoring, induction, resource and 
political capital distribution. When policies and performances are evaluated 
for improvement purposes, burdens and bonuses are distributed to managers 
and corporations, according to the results gathered. That perspective changes 
the evaluation object itself, for good or bad, turning the entire process 
more complex. It should be observed that it may be a mistake to award with 
resources the States or the areas that present the most serious data, the highest 
crime rates, since the valuation may turn failure attractive. The opposite, on 
the other hand, may condemn the situation that needs most support to the 
abandonment and to the vicious circle of the aggravation that retrofeeds itself.
Paradoxical results – that is, eminently positive, but, at the same time, 
generators of negative effects (that ambivalence being synchronic or diachronic, 
according to the case) – are another source of problems for evaluations.  For 
that reason, a good policy must remain open, authorizing successive orientation 
changes, despite starting from permanent general lines.  Such opening would 
correspond to the acknowledgement of the dynamic character of the picture 
on which it intends to fall – the dynamism, in this case, reflects the movements 
that derive from the very impacts precipitated by the policy adopted.  Therefore, 
that is not about, precisely, prophecies that come into being for themselves 
(because the problems being considered already existed before the intervention 
directed to solve them and they’re not aggravated by it; on the contrary, they’re 
minimized or solved) or of actions that generate perverse effects (because the 
targeted effects are reached).  However, the positive results – those to which 
we ascribe the quality of the ambivalence and of the paradox – create new 
challenges.
 One example: let’s say that the improvement of the police investigations 
increase the solution rates of certain crimes, reducing impunity.  That may 
eventually stimulate the development of more sophisticated organization, 
communication, and action techniques by the criminals who act in that area.  
Better organized, equipped and oriented, the criminals may become more 
ambitious and more dangerous, both in their choices and their actions. The cost 
of investing in that qualification effort, by the criminals, may be compensated 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 2007 81
by the inflated value of the objects or goods (material or not) that they target. 
That inflation may be, in turn, determined by the greater risk of the necessary 
operations to obtain such goods or objects.  The risk increase comes from the 
improvement of the police services (a good in itself, since it generates countless 
benefits for society) or of the roughening of the penal laws – which shows how 
false might be the supposition that rougher laws are efficient against crime.
 Take the case of drugs: as the combat to the international traffic 
becomes more intense, the greater become the risks of the illegal transportation 
and of the distribution for retail. The naive interpretation would deduce from 
that increase of costs an occasional tendency towards reducing the pace of the 
drug trade. However, what is more difficult and involves more risks has greater 
value and starts to require, in order to take place, a payment correspondent to 
the new value, subject to inflation, paradoxically, due to the new obstacles added 
to the provision of the illicit service.  Greater gains, in turn, imply a greater 
stimulation to investments in that area of the illegal economy and a greater 
capability to recruit operators willing to face obstacles and risks. In other words, 
the spiral described above turns every burden added to the criminal act into a 
promise of benefit, an increase of the reward.
 The same holds true for the case of corruption: improvement of the 
control instruments, intensification of repressive actions, and the increase of 
punishments increase the transgression cost.  However, the cycle doesn’t end 
there.  Considering that the part of the illicit gain (let’s say it has to do with 
cheating an auction) appropriated by the criminal moderator is, by definition, 
elastic, the risk increase may foster a new arrangement, in whose scope the profit 
margin of the fraud beneficiary is reduced – without reducing its attractiveness 
–, and increases, proportionally, the percentage to be received by the broker, 
maintaining, for him or her, the interest of the operation. If the process 
increases the value of the operation too much, it may, instead of de-motivating 
it, bring about its quality change, making it even more harmful.  For example, 
fostering the agreement among the auction competitors so that they manipulate 
it, including it in a more comprehensive package, in whose terms all the parties 
involved would benefit, in the medium run, harming the public interest in a 
more proficient and more intense way.  That doesn’t mean that nothing can be 
done and that both the government and the society must yield to the inevitable.  
But it does mean that really effective interventions do require more wit and art 
– that is, more attention to the complexity than the quick view of the problem 
would suppose to be necessary.
In that context, maybe some questions that otherwise might seem 
inconsequent and arbitrary become relevant: wouldn’t the so-called “drugs 
problem” derive precisely from the criminalization, turning them into a public 
security issue?  And how about corruption, aren’t we fighting it by means 
of expensive and counterproductive methods?  Nowadays, in Brazil, there 
are several control mechanisms that involve considerable expenses and a real 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 200782
bureaucratic entanglement, turning management much more difficult and 
requiring fiscal exactness of recessive effects. Maybe that burdensome and 
paralyzing entanglement exercises a contradictory role, fostering corruption, for 
the reasons described above.
Paradoxical effects of the security policies and of the police performance 
may still be the migrations of criminal practices: the success of certain local 
interventions eventually fosters a displacement of the crimes to contiguous 
neighborhoods, nearby cities or neighbor states. Therefore, the aggregate result 
may be kept unchanged or become worse, since migrations may imply territorial 
disputes and intensification of the resource to violence for the criminal venture 
to become feasible.  There’s also the non-geographic migration, but that of crime 
type: when repression to bank robberies increases, the criminals might move to 
kidnaps and from there to cargo robbery – and so on.
 The same occurs internationally: greater strictness in the combat to 
terrorism, for example, might induce displacement from their headquarters to 
peripheral areas and to the central political disputes – from the point of view of 
the protagonists of terror. Let’s put ourselves in the shoes of the terror agent.  
What is he looking for?  What does he need (besides money and militants) to 
create his intervention means, training his teams and gathering information to 
plan actions?  The following conditions are indispensable: access to a territory 
located in a geopolitically stable and peaceful region, which doesn’t raise much 
suspicion and of low interest to the intelligence agencies of the countries directly 
involved in the terrorist confrontations.
 A territory where impunity prospers, characterized by the low quality 
of national security service, where illegal weapons move around freely, where 
there are broad spaces for training, far from the attention of governmental 
institutions and with not much access to the media. A territory that provides 
almost unlimited access to first-rate technology and communications, served 
by fast and efficient transportation to any place in the world – that is, inserted 
in the globalization process, but relatively unruly, due to its sovereignty and to 
the panoptic voraciousness of the central countries.  A politically independent 
territory that doesn’t get deeply involved in the conflicts in which the terrorists 
are involved, where there are no great population segments that tend to engage 
in the politics of the regions in conflict, where the domestic political situation is 
stable, and where the economy favors the use of cheap native labor. Therefore, 
of course Brazil would standout as a preferred option, if that was the calculation 
of the terrorists. In that sense, the efficient anti-terror action abroad would 
converge with the lack of national attention, to say the least: the result of that 
could be the migration to our country of training bases and terrorist operations.
It should be observed that not only results are relevant for the 
evaluation.  Intermediate processes and goals, identified by institutional 
diagnoses as being especially relevant, must be objects of a systematic critical 
follow-up. For example: the quality of the training and of the qualification of 
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the police officers and other professionals who act in the public security area, 
the consistency of the data produced, the management methods, the reliability 
and effectiveness of the internal and external controls, etc. For the case of 
preemptive policies, the programs applied may have value according to different 
criteria, regardless of perceptible results in the short term. In that sense, it 
should also be said that the time perspective is necessary for a strict, though not 
always feasible evaluation, due to the practical nature of the evaluation itself, 
which is useful, after all, for the corrective monitoring of the examined system, 
the improvement of which can’t wait for a decade of comparative studies.
Let’s leave for now the reflection about the evaluation limits of public 
security policies and of police performance and let’s go on to the description of 
the plans that prescribe public security policies, as well as about the movements 
begun by the relevant players to implement them. The observation scope is 
national and the period is the last eight years (2000-2007, still in course).
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s terms:
 shy development of a new moment
 Successive Ministers of Justice of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s (FHC) 
second term, with the help of national security secretaries, were developing 
a national public security plan, when a young survivor of the Candelária 
slaughter, Sandro, seized, in the heart of the carioca Southern Zone, bus 174, 
for the perplexity of the entire country, which the TV stations transformed 
in an inert witness of the tragedy, in real time.  Immediately thereafter, the 
president of the Republic established that his aides should take the papers 
out of their drawers, and decide, at last, what would be the national security 
agenda, at least from the point of view of the Federal engagements. In one 
week, the nation would get to know the first public security plan of its recent 
democratic history, which, due to precocious delivery, precipitated by forceps, 
was disclosed in the clumsy form of a non-systematic list of heterogeneous 
intentions.  It should be observed that, before, during FHC’s first term, 
important steps were taken towards the affirmation of a particularly significant 
agenda for public security, when it was conceived according to democratic 
principles: the National Secretary for Human Rights was created and the first 
National Human Rights Plan was elaborated.
 That document lacked the support of a policy, which would require the 
identification of priorities, a scale of importance, the identification of a set of 
neuralgic points that condition the most significant processes, in such a way 
that marginal and articulate or simultaneous and sudden changes could alter 
the key aspects, fostering adequate conditions to the strategic transformations, 
oriented to clearly described goals. However, that can’t be reached without a 
systemic conception of the problems, in its multiple dimensions, both social and 
institutional; besides, it can’t be reached without a diagnosis, without which 
the establishment of goals and criteria, methods and mechanisms for evaluation 
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and monitoring is not feasible. The document presented to the nation as being a 
plan didn’t meet the minimum requirements to make it worth of that name.
 Among the good ideas present in that “plan”, the acknowledgement of 
the importance of violence prevention stood out, so much so that the Plan for the 
Integration and Attendance of the Social Programs to Prevent Violence (Piaps) 
derived from it. Its mission was to promote the local interaction and, therefore, 
the reciprocal strengthening of the social programs implemented by the Federal, 
State and Local governments which, directly or indirectly, could contribute to 
reduce the factors of a potentially criminal nature. The ambition was formidable, 
as well as the obstacles to its execution. Considering the Brazilian government 
structure, which is characterized by the business segmentation, a late reflection 
of the second industrial revolution, nothing is more difficult than integrating 
sector programs, generating, by means of the coordination, an inter-sector policy. 
Mainly when the intention overcomes the domain of a single government sphere 
and extends to all three Federation levels.
Important efforts were made by the National Secretary for Public 
Security (Senasp) in the right direction: the establishment of cooperation 
conditions among the public security institutions, the support to initiatives 
aiming at the police qualification, the investment (although shy) in the 
expansion of the alternative punishments to the denial of liberty, the 
development of more rational management perspectives, in the state police 
departments and in the security secretaries, through the elaboration of public 
security plans, in which goals to be reached could be defined.
 The greatest example of the late and modest attention of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s second term to security was the creation of the National 
Public Security Fund, which would be under the responsibility of Senasp and 
Seizure of bus 174 in the Botanical Garden neighborhood, Rio de 
Janeiro: the kidnaper, Sandro do Nascimento, with the hostage 
Geísa Gonçalves, negotiates with the police after leaving the bus.
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which, supposedly, would serve as an instrument to induce adequate policies. 
However, due to the absence of a systemic national policy, with the cleanly 
postulated priorities, due to the retail and reactive dispersion of the decisions, 
which reflected itself in and was inspired by the dispersive and non-systematic 
character of the national plan of the year 2000, the Fund ended up limited to 
confirming old procedures, ancient obsessions, and traditional habits: the act 
of passing forward the resources, instead of serving as a political tool directed 
to the induction of structural  reforms, in practice was destined, above all, 
to buying arms and police vehicles. In other words: the Fund was absorbed 
by the inertial force and surrendered to the voluntarist impulse that only 
does more of the same. Exhausted structures were fed, benefitting mistaken 
policies and tolerating the familiarity with police organizations refractory to 
the rational management, to the evaluation, to the monitoring, to the external 
control and even to a minimally effective and non-corporative internal control.
 The democratic spirit of most Ministers of Justice who took turns in 
the government confirmed that real and involuntary capitulationism. Excusing 
themselves from bolder interventions, renouncing to the reformist initiative, 
ministers and national secretaries repeated to exhaustion meetings with state 
security secretaries and police chiefs, with the goal to persuade them to 
participate in the national effort, for example, of standardization of the police 
information language – an indispensable requirement for the establishment 
of minimal conditions for the operational cooperation. The small sabotage, 
the smallness of the interpersonal quarrels, the clash between projects and the 
political rivalries got combined and created the culture broth for what could be 
called “veto policy” to prosper, thanks to which the entire national movement 
towards the administrative rationalization and towards the institutional 
modernization became a hostage of the bad will of a state authority, of the 
bad mood of an obscure character, of a business contraction, of a mediocre 
provincial dispute.
 Any way, it should be emphasized that Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
term marked a positive change, democratic and progressive, modernizing 
and rationalizing, since it gave the security issue a superior political status, 
acknowledging its importance, the seriousness of the situation and the need 
for the Federal government to take upon itself responsibilities in that issue; 
and it established a political commitment with the human rights agenda, more 
specifically in the public security area, with a virtuous list of topics (prevention, 
inter-sector and inter-governmental integration, valuation of the local 
experience, police qualification, encouragement to community police, support 
to the witness protection program and to the creation of hearing tribunals).  
Unfortunately, the richness of the agenda was not accompanied by the necessary 
and sufficient means for its execution – means being understood in this case 
in its broad sense: there was a lack of funds, adequate political orientation, 
leadership and effective commitment, and a systemic and consistent plan 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 21 (61), 200786
that would guarantee a resource distribution correspondent to the priorities 
identified in the diagnosis.
It should be observed that, before the shy but inaugural movements 
of FHC’s government, the public security field, in the Federal scope, had 
been characterized by indifference and lack of mobility, with the Federal 
managers accepting to continue traditional practices, adapting them to 
the new democratic context, established by the 1988 Constitution. The 
organizational structures, however, remained untouched by the process of 
transition to democracy, which was crowned by the promulgation of the citizen 
Constitution.  The authorities that followed him limited themselves to receive 
the legacy of an authoritarian tradition, in a non-critical manner, reproducing 
its basic characteristics, introducing mere residual adjustments. In other words, 
the police departments and their practices stopped being, ostensibly, directed 
exclusively to the state security, redirecting themselves, in the perfunctory, to 
the defense of the citizens and the protection of their rights – mainly in the 
official speech level and of the procedures adopted in the rich areas of the cities. 
However, the old arbitrary brutality remained as the distinctive feature of the 
relationship with the popular layers, mainly the blacks, in the peripheries and 
slums. The same took place with the penitentiary system and with the prisons in 
general.
 Times have changed, the country was cleaned up, in a certain sense, 
adapting to the new political ecology, in view of the raise of the social 
movements and of the associative character, but the public security institutions 
preserved their obsolete formats – with the police work cycle divided between 
the Military and Civil police -, their administrative irrationality, their 
qualification incompatible with the growing complexity of the new challenges, 
their old mutual rivalry, their isolation, their permeability to corruption, their 
disregard to their own professionals, their disdain for science and technology, 
and their unrealistic budgets, which forced the professionals to get a second job 
in the illegal public security and in hazy activities.
In one word, the democratic transition has not been extended to the 
public security, which corresponds to a live testimony of our obscure past and, 
from the point of view of the citizenship interests, inefficient. Even though the 
state and regional realities are very different, the public security institutions have 
become, as a rule, a part of the problem, instead of the solution.
 Lula’s first term: a bold proposal that politics denied
President Lula’s first term began with hope for most of the population, 
and also for those who were devoted to public security and believed in the 
campaign promises.  In February, 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, as a pre-
candidate to the presidency of the Republic by the Labor Party (PT) and 
President of the Citizenship Institute, along with the coordinators of the National 
Public Security Plan3, presented it to the nation, in the National Congress, before 
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the Minister of Justice, Aloysio Nunes Ferreira, the President of the House of 
Representatives, and the President of the Senate, Ramez Tebet.
 The Plan was received with respect even by his political adversaries, 
because there was a clear commitment to the technical seriousness, it rejected 
ideological slangs, assumed an eminently non-adherent stance and aimed at 
contributing to the construction of a minimum national consensus, taking 
for granted that public security is a State issue, not a government one, being, 
therefore, above the political and partisan disputes.  Once confirmed as a 
candidate, Lula added the Plan to his Government Program.
 The National Public Security Plan was elaborated within the scope 
of the Citizenship Institute, in more than one year of work, having heard 
managers, researchers, experts and professionals from the most distinct 
institutions and regions of the country, graduated in the most varied disciplines, 
besides society leaders, all over the country. We, the coordinators, also 
tried to add, as far as possible, the successful experiences, both national and 
international. Once Lula was elected, the National Public Security Secretary had 
the task to apply the Plan, which started to be done, until successive signs made 
clear the unwillingness of the government to carry out all the commitments 
assumed.
 The author was the National Public Security secretary between January 
and October, 2003, with the task to put in progress the first stages of the Plan, 
namely:
1.  To build a consensus with the governors about the Plan itself, its 
virtues, its convenience, its opportunity, its feasibility, demonstrating 
the benefits that it would provide to the country as a whole and to 
each state, in private, if the necessary efforts were made, according 
to cooperative, supra-partisan, and republican patterns, so as to 
overcome the business opposition, the material limitations, the 
operational and management difficulties, and the proposed measures 
came into being. Structured in modules, the Plan should be 
implemented one stage at a time, which would imply – according to 
our optimistic forecast – the progressive affirmation of the tendency 
to broaden the support bases to the plan itself, gradually, both in the 
police departments and in the society.
2. The crucial topics of the agreement to be celebrated would be the 
standardization of the Single Public Security System (Susp) and the 
de-constitutionalization of the police departments.
3. The State and the Federal governments would be in charge of 
installing Public Security Integrated Management Offices, one in 
each state, which would work as an operational branch of Susp and 
would start to work according to the political agreement, even before 
the standardization that would institutionalize them. GGI would be 
an executive forum that would gather the police departments, of all 
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instances, and, when invited, the other criminal justice institutions. 
The decisions would be made exclusively by consensus, in order to 
eliminate the main obstacle to the inter-institutional cooperation: 
the competition for command. Since it was verified that there was a 
broad consensus agenda, for practical actions, in the Public Security 
area, there was no fear of paralysis by veto. It should be observed that 
the GGIs started to work immediately and in the few states where, in 
the following years, they weren’t depleted by political boycott, they 
produced good results and showed that they were promising formats.
4. The Federal government, in turn, would be in charge of providing 
the resources of the National Public Security Fund, in 2003 and of 
considerably increasing it in the following years. For that reason, a 
negotiation began with the World Bank and with IDB, aiming at an 
investment with subsidized interest of U$ 3.5 billion, for seven years. 
The National Security Fund would be accepted by the creditors as 
the Federal government’s counterpart.
5. The Federal government would also be in charge of sending to 
the National Congress the constitutional amendment for the de-
constitutionalization of the police departments and, as an infra-
constitutional matter, the standardization of the Single Public 
Security System.
6. Once the 27 governors signed the terms of the agreement, the 
President would call them for the solemn celebration of the Pact 
for Peace, reinforcing, politically, the common commitment to the 
implementation of the National Security Policy Plan.
We were very close to reaching the national agreement about the 
reforms, since the governors were willing to cooperate, signing the adhesion 
letter subject to the appreciation of each one of them. However, President 
Lula, for the surprise of those who were building the consensus by means of 
delicate negotiations, didn’t confirm the participation of the government in the 
National Pact. Thus, there wasn’t step number six. If the President had called 
the governors to celebrate the Pact, steps four and five would be complete, 
almost automatically, without great traumas – despite the natural difficulties, 
but certainly possible to overcome, considering the political power that the 
President had at the moment, as well as the governors’ leadership.
 The president reviewed his adhesion to the Plan and gave up following 
the expected path because he noticed – by talking to the instance that, at the 
time, was called “hard core of the government” – that to do that would imply 
taking for granted the greater protagonist role of the institutional reform of 
the public security in Brazil, that is, it would imply taking for granted the 
responsibility for security, before the public opinion. And that would expose 
him to political risks, since the responsibility for each problem, in each corner 
of each city would be ascribed to him. The wear and tear would be inevitable, 
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since the practical effects of an institutional re-organization would only be felt 
in the long run.
Considering the contradiction, in Brazil, between the electoral cycle 
(biennial, since the holders of executive posts necessarily engage in the disputes 
for the other federation spheres) and the maturation period of greater public 
policies (the more ambitious ones, which require reforms and harm interests, 
causing, in a first moment, negative reactions and destabilizing effects), it 
becomes burdensome, politically, to deal with the risk of the changes and, 
therefore, from the point of view of the utilitarian calculation of the individual 
player, it becomes irrational to do it.
 Thus, in 2003, we reached a national agreement about significant 
transformations and created a new operational agency, the GGIs, but the results 
were lost due to the change of path in the Ministry of Justice and in 
the Presidency.
 The elementary features of the National Public Security Plan of 
President Lula’s first term were original: it had to do with a set of proposals 
articulated by a systemic structure, aiming at the reform of the police 
departments, of the penitentiary system and at the integrated implementation of 
inter-sector preemptive policies. In other words, it was understood that topical 
changes produce effects on the other components of the contemplated universe 
and that a transformation that is sufficient to cause an impact on the reality 
of criminal violence requires simultaneous and successive changes, in different 
levels and scales, respecting the specific logics and rhythms. Above all, there 
was the certainty that the internal consistency and the objectivity of a Plan 
depend on the strictness of the diagnosis and of what it includes, as well as the 
success of its implementation depends on regular evaluations and systematic 
monitoring, identifying the mistakes so that there’s no risk of repeating them 
indefinitely.
 The main points of the reform program of the police departments would 
be: recruiting, formation, qualification and training; professional valuation; 
knowledge management and national standardization of the categories that 
organize the data, so that they can work as information; introduction of 
management mechanisms, changing functions, routines, technology and 
organizational structure; investment in know-how; articulation with preemptive 
policies; external control; qualification of the participation of the municipalities, 
by means of preemptive policies and Municipal Guards, preparing them to 
become, in a near future, complete cycle police departments, without repeating 
the bad habits of the existent ones; investment in punishments other than the 
denial of liberty and the creation of the necessary conditions for the Law of 
Penal Executions (LEP) to be respected in the penitentiary system.
 The standardization of Susp would only be the legal definition of the 
operation rules of the topics mentioned above. Therefore, Susp wouldn’t imply 
the unification of the police departments, but the generation of means that 
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would allow them to work in a cooperative manner, according to an integrated 
management matrix, always with transparency, external control, evaluations and 
connective monitoring. In that model’s terms, the police work would be mainly 
guided towards prevention and would try to articulate with social policies of a 
specifically preemptive nature.
 Together with the institutionalization of Susp mentioned above, the 
National Public Security Plan of President Lula’s first term proposed the de-
constitutionalization of the police departments, which means transferring to 
the States the power to define, according to their respective constitutions, 
the police model that they wish, want and/or can have. Therefore, each state 
would be authorized to change or to maintain the status quo, as it considered 
appropriate or not. In other words, it could maintain the current framework 
if it understood that breaking the cycle of the police work, represented by 
the dichotomic organization, Military Police – Civil Police, was working 
well. Otherwise, if the evaluation was negative – if it was verified the lack of 
motivation by the professionals and lack of confidence by the population, 
inefficiency, corruption and brutality –, changes could be made and new 
models would be tried. For example, the unification of the current state police 
departments, or the creation of complete cycle metropolitan and municipal 
police departments (at least in the larger cities), or the division of work among 
municipal, state and federal police departments, according to the complexity 
of the crimes to be faced, knowing, however, that all of them would work at 
a complete cycle regime, that is, investigating and executing the uniformed 
patrol.
Brazil is a federative Republic; it’s a continental nation, characterized 
by profound regional differences. Uniform solutions are not necessarily the 
best. Besides, they eventually face the veto policy, which is used by states that 
have no political conditions to foster changes in their police departments or 
by those that consider counterproductive to do that. That context leads to the 
paralysis and turns the states that need urgent and profound transformations 
into hostages of those that choose to maintain the status quo. It should be 
observed that, according to what is established by the National Security Plan, 
in case of changes, the policemen would be utilized in the new institutions, 
going through requalification processes, provided that their professional records 
recommended the utilization.
 Always according to the National Plan of Lula’s first term, de-
constitutionalization wouldn’t imply confusion in terms of the matrix 
principles, according to the definition of the very role and the very nature 
of the police departments in the Democratic State of Law. The elementary 
principles would be kept under the Federal Constitution. It would be the 
organizational models that would be defined by the states. The possibility 
that Brazil would enter a phase of intense experimentalism is considered to 
be very promising instead of leading to chaos, to more fragmentation and 
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to more inefficiency than what it’s currently verified. That’s because the de-
constitutionalization would take place at the same time as the standardization 
of Susp, a process that would compensate the federative flexibilization, since 
it would establish rules that could be applied to all police departments already 
existent or to be created. Today there’s a babel-like fragmentation in the 
formation, in the information, in the management, in the distances between 
the Federal and the State institutions – and even those, in their respective 
scope of action. Susp would mean bringing order to chaos and the generation 
of conditions for the effective cooperation, both horizontal and vertical.
 The political trap described above, which is a result of the contradiction 
between the electoral cycle and the maturation period of reformist public 
policies, eventually led the federal government to retire, precociously, its 
ambitious commitments in the public security: the National Plan was displaced, 
progressively, from the center of the agenda of the Ministry of Justice, and 
substituted, gradually, by actions of the Federal Police, which began to send 
to the society the message of competent and fearless activity, on the opposite 
direction of our traditional and corrosive impunity. However, it’s not necessary 
to consider that, no matter how virtuous the Federal Police operations have 
been – pertinent questions emerged about the consistency of some of them and 
the mediatic character of many of them –, police actions can’t replace a Public 
Security Policy. Mainly in a situation such as the Brazilian one, characterized by 
institutional fragmentation and by the lack of compatibility between the model 
inherited from the dictatorship and the growing challenges of a society that is 
becoming more complex and transnational, in a democratic though profoundly 
unequal context.
What remained as the most significant contributions to public security, 
in the scope of the federal government, were the efforts made by Senasp in favor 
of the police qualification, with courses at a distance and in person (necessary 
but insufficient efforts, since they would have to be accompanied by the creation 
of a national elementary cycle common to all public security professionals 
and by the creation of a Federal Police Education Council independent from 
governments and broadly acknowledged capability, to evaluate, monitor, 
guide changes, debate procedures and question methodologies, in the light 
of the knowledge produced both in Brazil and abroad), and those made in 
favor of disarmament, the impact of which, according to some analysts, would 
have reduced the deceitful homicides in Brazil. However, the result of the 
referendum, which favored the arms trade, reduced the initial impetus of the 
movement, which united police departments and significant segments of society.
 Two important original commitments of the National Public Security 
Plan, with which President Lula began his first term, were discarded: the 
elevation of the status of Senasp to ministry level, turning it into a Special 
Secretary, directly tied to the Presidency of the Republic, to the scope of which 
would be transferred both Federal Police departments; and the displacement of 
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the Antidrugs National Secretary (Senad) to the reinforced Senasp (or to the 
Ministry of Justice, or of Health).
 Lula’s second term: resuming commitments,
 broadening repertoires, postponing controversial issues
 On August 20th, 2007, the Federal government launched the National 
Public Security with Citizenship Program (Pronasci), through Provisional 
Measure 384, committing itself to invest US$ 3.746 billion, until the end of 
2012, in a set of 94 actions, which will involve nineteen ministries, in articulate 
interventions with states and municipalities.
From the point of view of the matrix principles, Pronasci confirms the 
National Public Security Plan of President Lula’s first term, which, in turn, 
incorporated, systematized and turned explicit what was already present, 
embryonically or tacitly, in the National Plan of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
term. That shows that, despite the differences and the precariousness of the 
treatment given to the issue of the principles, in FHC’s term plan, there has 
been more continuity than discontinuity among the successive efforts, that 
already constitute a historical series more relevant as it distinguishes itself from 
the previous period, still heavily characterized by a reverent omission, relative to 
the area – which is a taboo – of Public Security.
 The consensus values being discussed – which Pronasci endorses and 
emphasizes – are the following: human rights and police efficiency are not 
opposed. On the contrary, they’re mutually necessary, since there’s no police 
efficiency without respect to human rights, as well as the validity of those rights 
depends on the guarantee offered, as a last resort, by the police efficiency. Neither 
is it pertinent to oppose prevention to qualified repression. Both varieties of 
action of the State are legitimate and useful, depending on the context. The 
police exercises an essential historical role to build democracy, the obligation 
of which was to protect rights and liberties. In that sense, using the moderate 
force, proportional to the risk represented by the other’s resistance to the police 
authority, impeding the aggression or any harmful act to other people doesn’t 
mean repressing the liberty of those who perpetrate violence, but preserving 
rights and liberties of the potential victims. Therefore, the improvement of 
the police apparatus and of the public education should not be alternative and 
excludent objects of state investment. A truly democratic society can’t be built 
without equality in the access to Justice, which depends on the quality and on 
the orientation of the police departments (and of the other institutions of the 
criminal justice system) and of equity in the access to education.
Pronasci also has the merit to value the contribution of the 
municipalities to public security, breaking the restrictive prejudices that come 
from a limited interpretation of Article 144 of the Constitution – a contribution 
that doesn’t stop in the creation of the Civil Guards, but it’s extended to the 
implementation of preemptive social policies.
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 Another fundamental principle, explicitly resumed by Pronasci of the 
Plan launched by Lula in 2002, states that security is a State matter, not a 
government one, being located, therefore, above the political-partisan disputes.
Comparing the plans of the two terms of President Lula, some 
significant differences become clear: in favor of Pronasci, it should stand out 
the publication of the Provisional Measure that instituted it, which implies, 
among other advantages, formal involvement of the government with its 
implementation and political strengthening of the agents in charge of it. The 
operators work under constant tension and insecurity, when the plan to which 
they serve and which they struggle to implement is only sustained by the word 
of the leader, sometimes evasive and purely rhetoric.
 Still in favor of Pronasci, it should be registered the importance of the 
explicitation of the resources to be destined to its implementation, in six years 
(2007-2012), which, in turn, implies an additional benefit: the commitment of 
the next government, at least in its first half, to the continuity of the works and 
the fulfillment of the foreseen goals.
Particularly positive also is the identification of the institution in charge 
of the program evaluation, as well as the designation of local evaluation agents 
– which means that there will be investment in the building of indicators and 
in the development of evaluation methods. From that might derive a dynamic 
that spreads a new institutional culture, still inexistent in the Public Security 
area, as has been seen, not only because of all the difficulties pointed out in the 
first unit of this essay, but also, and above all, by the absence of institutional 
mechanisms indispensable to a rational management, in the police departments: 
technology, functions and routines, compatible organizational structure, and 
personnel qualification.
Members of the National Public Security Force get in position 
during an operation for drugs seizure in the Grota slum, located i
n Alemão Complex, suburb of Rio de Janeiro.
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But there weren’t only advances. Next are some items of Pronasci that 
represent a retrogression, in relation to the Security Plan with which President 
Lula won the 2002 election: (a) Instead of a systemic unit, a result of a diagnosis 
that identifies priorities and reveals the interconnections among the topics 
contemplated by the plan, there’s the listing of proposals, organized according 
to descriptive categories (in themselves debatable) but essentially fragmentary 
and inorganic, that is, shy of a political support; (b) The involvement of too 
many ministries reminds of Piaps, with its merits and difficulties. The intention 
is excellent, but the arrangement doesn’t seem very realistic, knowing how 
atomized is our public engine and how bureaucratic and departmentalized are 
the management mechanisms; (c) The only reference to the regulation of the 
Single Public security System (Susp) is very brief, superficial, not very clear, and 
suggests a limited understanding, reducing it to the operational dimension: 
“Pronasci will regulate the Single Public Security System (Susp), already agreed 
upon between the states and the Federal government, but yet to be established 
by law. Susp decides about the functioning of the public security agencies. 
Its goal is to articulate the Federal, State and Municipal actions in the Public 
Security and in the Criminal Justice areas” (Document of the Ministry of 
Justice called Pronasci); (d) The crucial topic, the institutional reforms, is not 
even mentioned – probably due to its politically controversial character (due to 
the lack of definition of the government leaders about the model to be used) 
and of its disaggregating potential, derived from the inevitable corporative 
reactions that it would call forth. Thus, with Susp anemic and without its 
institutional complement – de-constitutionalization or some reformist formula, 
in the organizational structures level –, the police status quo and, more broadly, 
the fragmentary picture of the public security are eventually assimilated. Thus, 
the legacy of the dictatorship becomes natural, considering the incomplete 
transition as the possible one. Pronasci resigns itself to being only a good Plan 
aiming at providing topical contributions.
Let’s examine the categories with which Pronasci is formulated. The 
two regulatory categories are called “Structural actions” and “Local programs”. 
The “Structural actions” category includes the following thematic axis: 
“Modernization of the public security institutions and of the prison system”; 
“Valuation of the public security professionals and penitentiary agents”; 
“Coping with police corruption and with the organized crime”; “Local 
programs” – the latter are divided into: “Peace territory”; “Integration of the 
youngster and his family”; “Security and living together”.
In the first axis of the “Structural actions”, which is called, as has been 
seen before, “Modernization of the public security institutions and of the prison 
system”, the following topics can be found: (a) “National Public Security Force” 
– in which it is said when it was created, how many professionals compose 
it, what is it for, and that it will have its own headquarters in Brasília, where 
there will be 500 agents, ready to be deployed if called by the governors; (b) 
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“Federal Highway Police” – in which there are brief references to improvements, 
in a single paragraph; (c) “Places in prisons” – in which there’s a promise 
of 37.8 thousand new places until 2011, and the building of prisons for 
youngsters between 18 and 24 years old; (d) “Organic Law of the Civil Police 
Departments” – in which the content of the Organic Law mentioned above 
is not specified; (e) “Regulation of Susp” (already commented); (f) “Maria 
da Penha Law” (protection to women) – in which there’s a promise to build 
education and rehabilitation centers for aggressors; (g) “Federal Police College”; 
(h) “Disarmament campaign”.
In the second axis, “Valuation of the public security professionals 
and of penitentiary agents”, are included: (a) “Qualification scholarship”; (b) 
“Dwelling”; (c)
“Education at a distance network”; (d) “Undergraduate and masters degree”; 
(e) “Qualification of the penitentiary agents”; (f) “Assistance to vulnerable 
groups” – in which the commitment to qualify the security professionals to 
treat in an adequate and respectful manner “women, homosexuals, blacks and 
other minorities”; (g) “Human rights journeys”; (h) “Non-lethal technologies”; 
(i) “Incidents command”; (j) “Intelligence”; (l) “Crimes investigation”; (m) 
“Municipal Guards”; (n) “Community Police”.
 The third axis, “Coping with police corruption and with the organized 
crime”, include: (a) “Laboratories to fight money laundering”; (b) “Hearing and 
corrective tribunals”; (c) “People’s traffic”.
In the first thematic area subsumed by the second category, “Local 
programs”, called “Peace territory”, the following topics are included: (a) 
“Municipal Integrated Management Offices”; (b) Public Security Community 
Councils”; (c) “Community channel”.
In the second thematic axis, “Integration of the youngster and 
his family”, are included: (a) “Peace mothers”; (b) “Family health”; (c) 
“Qualification of the prisoner”; (d) Painting liberty and citizenship”.
In the third axis, “Security and living together”, the following topics are 
included: (a) “Urbanization”; (b) “Educational projects”; (c) “Cultural activities”.
 The presentations of the items are extremely brief. Therefore, it 
wouldn’t be fair to evaluate them based on the disclosed document. It will 
be necessary to wait for the presentation of Pronasci, in its complete and final 
version. However, certain positive and negative aspects stand out right away. 
The focused topics are extremely positive in themselves. They are all relevant, 
event though some are more important than others, even because they are 
preconditions for the others to be fulfilled. However, the non-systematic 
character of the Program, conceived as a list of topics and commitments that 
barely fit the ordering categories chosen or that fit them in a heterogeneous 
and non-symmetric manner, eventually leads to redundancies and lapses – that 
is, the steps that will complete the previous initiatives, to make them effective, 
since it’s worth reinforcing that many of them, even when they are virtuous in 
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themselves, may be condemned to be ineffective if they’re not accompanied by 
other measures and reforms, are not indicated.
I will give only a few examples, which could be many more: both 
Federal police departments are mentioned, stating a commitment to actions 
destined to promote topical improvements. However, nothing is said about the 
relations between them and about the relation of both with Senasp, as well as 
nothing is said about the relation of that institutional set with the state police 
departments. Criteria are also not identified for the distribution of resources 
of the National Public Security Fund, nor is there the acknowledgement that 
the Federal police departments, as much as the State ones, still don’t have 
evaluation, monitoring and external control mechanisms.
 The six axis of Susp are not acknowledged as being strategic targets of 
systemic and modular interventions: qualification, information, management, 
know-how, external control and articulation with the social policies. For that 
reason, Pronasci lists proposals in many of those areas, but doesn’t do that 
in a structured manner: it refers, for example, to several courses, but not to 
the substitution of the current babel-like fragmentation verified in the sector, 
nowadays, by a national model, respectful of the regional diversity and of the 
federative anatomy, yet integrating. The document doesn’t mention the future 
of the Municipal Guards. It only defends their valuation and qualification, 
attributing to them a calling for prevention, but it doesn’t take a side in the 
controversy about the institutional future of those corporations: there are 
dozens of constitutional amendments in the National Congress that propose 
their transformation in ostensive police departments, with uniforms and guns.
Is that change of status desirable if the Guards don’t submit themselves 
to an intense preparation and a profound reorganization, so that those future 
municipal police departments don’t repeat the bad habits of the Military Police? 
Should the breaking of the police work cycle be copied in the municipal level, 
that is, should the Guards be a small version of the Military Police? Or should 
we seize the historical opportunity of an institutional renewal of that size to 
overcome the dichotomy that currently divides the police work between the 
civil and the military police departments in the states? Why not municipal Civil 
Guards as complete cycle police departments, even if their community and 
preemptive calling are preserved?
 Thus, there are reasons both for optimism and for caution. The merits 
of Pronasci are sufficient to justify the hope that there will be advances in the 
Brazilian public security. But they don’t seem sufficient to justify the hope that 
the country will finally start to revolve the authoritarian rubbish that stalls 
progress in that area, with its irrationality and organizational disorder burdens 
that are not compatible with functions that are so important, demanding and 
sophisticated, in  an increasingly complex society, in which crime is increasingly 
organized, nationalized and transnationalized. On the other hand, considering 
the virtues of the commitments already made by the Minister of Justice, Tarso 
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Genro, by means of the publishing of Pronasci, with all its potential to produce 
positive results – even if they are partial and insufficient –, there are good 
reasons to believe that the process may strengthen his leadership and create 
more favorable political conditions to take the risks involved in the bolder 
reforms.
Notes
1  Summer changes habits, increases social gatherings in public spaces, which tends to increase the 
possibility of conflicts and the exposition to risks. The same holds true, within the week cycle, 
for weekends.
2  When compared to other diachronic cuts, that is, to other similar periods of time, the observed 
increase may actually prove to be a reduction of the increase that could be expected if the 
previously established historic pattern had been maintained.
3  Antonio Carlos Biscaia, Benedito Mariano, Roberto Aguiar and the author of this essay.
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